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EMPLOYMENT LAW
Can an EEOC Intake Questionnaire Constitute a
Charge of Discrimination Under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act?
by Paul M. Secunda & McCann LeFeve
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 56-59. © 2007 American Bar Association.
ISSUE
May an "intake questionnaire" sub-
mitted to the EEOC suffice for the
charge of discrimination that must
be submitted pursuant to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act,
even in the absence of evidence that
the EEOC treated the form as a
charge or the employee submitting
the questionnaire reasonably
believed it constituted a charge?
FACTS
On December 3, 2001, Patricia
Kennedy, a courier for Federal
Express (FedEx), filed an intake
questionnaire and four-page affidavit
with the EEOC alleging age discrim-
ination in violation of the ADEA.
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According to these documents,
throughout 1994 and 1995, FedEx
implemented the "Best Practices
Pays" policy. This policy required a
courier and his or her supervisor to
agree upon a "reasonable and safe
number of stops per hour" that
could be achieved on a particular
courier's route. If the courier
achieved this number, the result
was enhanced pay; however,
Kennedy's questionnaire and affi-
davit asserted that over time these
goals were treated as the minimum
acceptable number of stops oller
couriers were required to make to
ensure job retention. She went on
to explain that while she knew of
several older employees who were
either fired or "constructively termi-
nated" as a result of these policies,
she did not know of any younger
couriers who were terminated on
the same grounds.
Subsequently, a class action ADEA
complaint was filed by a number of
older FedEx employees, including
Kennedy, on April 30, 2002. On May
30, 2002, Kennedy filed a formal
charge of discrimination with the
EEOC.
FEDERAL EXPREss CORPORATION V
HOLOWECKI ET AL.
DOCKET No. 06-1322
ARGUMENT DATE:
NOVEMBER 6, 2007
FROM: THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Institution of an action under the
ADEA, as with other federal employ-
ment discrimination statues such as
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (Title VII) and the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), requires
individuals to file a charge with the
EEOC alleging unlawful discrimina-
tion prior to bringing suit in court.
Under the ADEA, plaintiffs are
required to wait 60 days before
bringing a cause of action in court.
However, unlike Title VII and the
ADA, individuals may bring a suit
under the ADEA regardless of
whether the EEOC has issued a
right-to-sue letter. If the EEOC does
issue a right-to-sue letter, the indi-
vidual has 90 days after receiving
the letter to file in federal court.
The district court held that
Kennedy's EEOC intake question-
naire did not constitute a charge
within the meaning of the ADEA.
Specifically, because Kennedy did
not file a formal administrative
charge until May 30, 2002, one
month after the complaint was filed,
she failed to meet the ADEA
requirement of filing a charge with
the EEOC 60 days before commenc-
ing suit in federal court and her
case was therefore dismissed.
The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the district court
and held that Kennedy's intake
questionnaire did constitute a
charge within the meaning of the
ADEA. The court held that
Kennedy's questionnaire constituted
an EEOC "charge" because (1) its
content satisfied the statutory and
regulatory requirements for what
content must be included in a
charge, and (2) the questionnaire
communicated Kennedy's intent to
her employer to activate the EEOC
administrative process.
CASE ANALYSIS
The ADEA does not define the term
"charge." 29 U.S.C. § 626(d).
However, the EEOC has established
regulations that specify what infor-
mation must appear in order for a
document to constitute a charge. 29
C.F.R. §§ 1626.3, 1626.6, 1828.8.
According to these regulations, a
charge is sufficient when the EEOC
receives a "writing" from the person
alleging discrimination that names
the employer and generally
describes the discriminatory acts.
Additionally, these regulations sug-
gest that charges should contain full
contact information for the employ-
er and the person filing the charge,
and a "clear and concise" statement
of facts, including pertinent dates.
When a charge is filed, the EEOC is
obligated to place the employer on
notice and begin investigation and
conciliation efforts. The EEOC has
created a formal charge form, EEOC
Form 5. The EEOC also utilizes an
intake questionnaire form, EEOC
Form 283. In some situations the
EEOC has treated intake question-
naires as charges, utilizing them to
provide notice to prospective defen-
dant employers and to begin the
investigation and conciliation
processes. However, the more com-
mon practice seems to be for the
EEOC to treat these intake ques-
tionnaires like informal documents
instead of charges.
The circuits who have decided
whether an intake questionnaire
form is sufficient to constitute a
charge have come to significantly
divergent conclusions, falling into
four separate camps. The first
approach, represented by the Sixth
Circuit, requires a formal charge.
The second approach, represented
by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits,
allows that an intake questionnaire
may serve as a charge when it con-
tains all the information necessary
for a charge and the EEOC treats it
like a charge by providing notice to
the employer and instigating concil-
iation efforts. The third approach,
taken by the Fourth and Ninth
Circuits, holds that an intake ques-
tionnaire could be a charge, regard-
less of how it is treated by the
EEOC, if it includes all the requisite
information necessary for a charge.
Finally, the fourth approach, repre-
sented by the Second Circuit in
Holowecki and adopted by the
Third Circuit, involves the "mani-
fest intent" standard, under which
an intake questionnaire can consti-
tute a "charge" if its content satis-
fies the statutory and regulatory
requirements for what content must
be included in a charge and the
questionnaire communicated the
employee's intent to her employer
to activate the EEOC administrative
process.
In arguing against treating the
intake questionnaire as a charge,
the brief for FedEx emphasizes
three main points: (1) Allowing any-
thing other than a formal charge to
suffice as a charge will increase liti-
gation, which in turn will place
undue burdens on employees,
employers, the courts, and the
EEOC alike; (2) allowing an intake
questionnaire to suffice as a charge
will essentially do away with the
statutory time restraints that are
contingent upon the filing of a
charge and result in indefinite liabil-
ity without notice for employers;
and (3) allowing precharge docu-
ments to constitute a charge will
significantly increase the EEOC's
workload.
More specifically, FedEx contends
that allowing precharge documents
to fulfill the functions of a charge
will increase litigation, because indi-
viduals will choose to bypass the
EEOC's conciliation process. It rea-
sons employees will suffer because
individuals will be forced to wait
longer for resolution. Employees will
be harmed further by incurring the
legal expenses necessary for litiga-
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American Bar Association
tion. On the other hand, employers
forced into litigation will face harm-
ful distractions, undue expense, and
deprivation of an opportunity to
resolve these disputes without litiga-
tion, in addition to potential liability
for employees' attorneys' fees.
FedEx also argues that the Second
Circuit's manifest intent approach
will lead to the possibility of stale
claims. It urges that under the
ADEA's 60-day requirement, an indi-
vidual may potentially abrogate all
time limits altogether. Under this
theory, if the EEOC never issues a
right-to-sue letter and the 60 day
waiting period has already passed,
employees could file suit whenever
they wanted to since neither time
limitation applies to their circum-
stances any longer. This will result
in indefinite employer liability for
events that may have occurred
many years ago. The effects of the
passage of time could result in
diminished ability of parties to
reconstruct facts, unavailable wit-
nesses or witnesses with diminished
recollection, and loss or destruction
of pertinent employment records.
Finally, FedEx asserts that if a docu-
ment other than a formal charge is
found to constitute a charge, indi-
viduals will bypass EEOC concilia-
tion and thus deny the EEOC the
opportunity to fulfill its statutory
functions. The importance of concil-
iation is evidenced by Congress's
recognition of the frailties of a pri-
vate lawsuit. According to this argu-
ment, Congress included the charge
requirement to facilitate the prompt
resolution of employment discrimi-
nation through conciliation.
Congress intended for the charge
requirement to provide notice to
potential defendant employers, both
to aid in conciliation and as a mat-
ter of fairness to the employer.
The FedEx employees, on the other
hand, emphasize three main points:
(1) The statute and amendments
were meant to help an average
employee file a charge and then
bring a lawsuit; (2) employees
should not be punished for the fail-
ings of the EEOC to comprehend
that the employee wanted the ques-
tionnaire to be treated like a charge;
and (3) a rule that finds a charge
has been made only when notice
has been given to the prospective
defendant employers is contrary to
Congress's intent and prior Supreme
Court holdings.
Beginning with the ADEA's history,
the employees assert that Congress's
relaxed charge requirements were
meant to allow employees to file
charges without having to pay for an
attorney. According to the employ-
ees, this is evidenced by a compari-
son of the ADEA's charge require-
ments with Title VII's charge
requirements.
Title VII requires verification of a
charge and the issuance of a right-
to-sue letter before a private action
may be filed. In Edelman v.
Lynchburg College, 535 U.S. 106,
110 (2002), the Supreme Court stat-
ed that "a charge is sufficient when
the Commission receives from the
person making the charge a written
statement sufficiently precise to
identify the parties and to describe
generally the action or practices
complained of." Additionally, the
Court held that Title VII is "a reme-
dial scheme in which lay persons,
rather than lawyers, are expected to
initiate the process... [and as a
result], the lay complainant who
may not know enough to verify on
filing will not risk forfeiting his
rights inadvertently."
On the other hand, the ADEA does
not specifically define the term
"charge" and does not require a ver-
ification or the issuance of a right-
to-sue letter before suit is brought.
Therefore, respondents assert that
since the ADEA's charge require-
ments are based substantially on
Title VII's charge requirements, a
comparison between the two
demonstrates Congress's intention
to place less emphasis on formal
requirements.
Additionally, the FedEx employees
point out that the 1978 amend-
ments to the ADEA removed a pro-
vision that required an individual
bringing a charge to file a notice of
intent to sue. Congress amended
this provision to restrict suits under
the ADEA only through time limita-
tions. In making these amendments,
Congress observed that "[flailure to
timely file notice [of intent to sue
was] the most common basis for
dismissal of ADEA lawsuits." S. Rep.
No. 493, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 12
(1977). As a result, one of
Congress's stated purposes for
amending the charge requirement
was "to make it more likely that the
courts will reach the merits of the
cases of aggrieved individuals."
Thus, by refusing to adopt the for-
mal charge requirements of Title VII
and later excising the ADEA's
stricter notice requirements,
Congress made it clear it did not
intend to define "charge" based on
its success of notifying defendant
employers of the complaints
brought against them.
The employees also emphasized the
penal nature of a rule requiring
notice to employers before allowing
suit to commence. They assert such
a rule would not depend upon the
content of the filing, as defined by
the EEOC's regulations, but only
upon the EEOC's obligation to pro-
vide prompt notice. Thus, the rule
would punish the employee for the
shortcomings of the agency.
This would be especially true where
an employer is unable to show that
the lack of notice prejudiced its
interests. For instance, in Love v.
Issue No. 2 Volume 35
Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 619
(1972), the Court found that when
an employer's lack of notice does
not prejudice its interests, the
requirement of "a second filing by
the aggrieved party would serve no
purpose other than the creation of
another procedural technicality.
Such technicalities are particularly
inappropriate in a statutory scheme
in which laymen, unassisted by
trained lawyers, initiate the
process."
Additionally, the ADEA's statutory
language only obligates the EEOC to
notify the employer's "promptly."
Thus, the FedEx employees contend
that the lack of a specific time evi-
dences Congress's intent to allow a
suit to be filed prior to the distribu-
tion of notice and that to hold oth-
erwise would penalize the lay
employee for the EEOC's failure to
perform its duty to act "promptly."
SIGNIFICANCE
Although in a recent Title VII case,
Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535
U.S. 106, 118 (2002), the Court
concluded that a "charge" did not
have to be "under oath or affirma-
tion" to be considered timely, the
Supreme Court has not yet directly
addressed the question of whether a
written submission to the EEOC
that is not on an EEOC charge form
may be considered a "charge."
The Supreme Court's decision in
Holowecki will likely resolve the
many inconsistencies among federal
circuit courts of appeal on the issue
of whether an EEOC intake ques-
tionnaire may constitute a charge of
discrimination under the ADEA.
Depending on the breadth of the
holding, the case may also answer
this same question for related feder-
al employment discrimination laws,
such as Title VII and the ADA.
Should the court adopt FedEx's
bright-line, formalistic approach,
individuals may lose their day in
court on a technicality. This is espe-
cially true among individuals who
file documents with the EEOC with-
out consulting an attorney. A for-
malistic approach fails to take into
account that laypersons are unlikely
to appreciate the legal requirements
for initiating a case.
Additionally, this approach could
mean an employee will be penalized
for the EEOC's mistakes, even when
the mistake is completely and total-
* ly out of the employee's control.
This most often occurs when
employees are misled by the EEOC
to believe a document constitutes a
charge. As a result of the EEOC's
mistake, these employees will be
denied access to the courts.
Practically speaking, an agency that
receives roughly 85,000 charges of
discrimination under several differ-
ent statutory schemes is likely to
make a mistake every once in a
while.
The Court's adoption of FedEx
employees' intent-based approach
could have a far reaching effect on
documents other than intake ques-
tionnaires, which contain the requi-
site amount of information. Under
this approach just a letter sent to
the EEOC might be sufficient to
constitute a charge. While ensuring
that individuals will not inadvertent-
ly forfeit their access to the courts,
this approach may create significant
confusion as to when a document
fulfills the requirements of the
EEOC. Ultimately, courts will be
forced to undertake a case-by-case
analysis. In addition to the possible
creation of more inconsistencies
among the circuits, an ad hoe analy-
sis may delay an employee's much
needed relief even more and con-
sume precious administrative
resources of both the EEOC and the
courts.
Additionally, if the use of other
types of documents means that
employers are not provided suffi-
cient notice of the claims brought
against them, employers may be
less likely to voluntarily correct dis-
criminatory practices. Furthermore,
it may be more difficult for the
EEOC to carry out its statutory,
gate-keeping function of exposing
frivolous claims and helping to con-
ciliate meritorious ones.
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